But is this outcome reasonable? Was Gaul really defeated in 1976? Or was the ranking simply a roll of the dice that depended on the use of this particular method for amalgamating the various individual opinions? What might other methods have proposed?
Truncated point-summing
When point-summing methods are used it is sometimes modified by first eliminating a competitor's highest and lowest grades in order to dampen the influence of exaggerated grades. For example, in figure skating competitions the top two and bottom two grades are dropped. In the Judgment of Paris dropping each wine's top and bottom grades does not change the order; however, dropping their two top and bottom grades does: Table 3 . Majority votes pair-by-pair.
The famous paradox of Condorcet is that majority vote may lead to no winner and no ranking. The Judgment of Paris is a striking example of its occurrence:
There is no Condorcet-winner -no first in the ranking -but there is a Condorcet-loser -a wine that is last in the ranking. Each of the five wines in the first group (A, B*, C*, D*, E) defeats all the others; for the others a wine to the left defeats a wine to the right. The first five wines are in a Condorcet-cycle. Or, ignoring a good deal of information, it might be said that there is a five-way tie for first place, the others occupying second through sixth places. Rank  1  1  1  1  1 3  2 5 6 4 Three French wines are in first place, only two California wines. Three California wines are in the last places.
Condorcet

A B* C* D* E F* G H I J
Borda's method
Borda [3] agreed with Condorcet: every judge should evaluate the merits of each wine compared successively to the merits of each of its competitors. But he advocated amalgamating the opinions by summing each wine's votes against all of the others (sums of the numbers in their rows in table 3 ). The idea is in spirit very similar to Quandt's yet different. It happens to give the same result in this case. This method should actually be known under another name since it was recently discovered that Cusanus [9] had proposed it in 1433.
Black's method
Duncan Black [2] suggested that the Condorcet majority-criterion should be used and where it fails the wines in a Condorcet-cycle should be ranked according to Borda's method. This gives the ranking
Llull's method
In 1299 Ramon Llull [8] advanced what seems to be the first formal presentation of a rule of voting. It is a generalization of the idea of a Condorcet-winner. He proposed that the wines be ranked according to its sum of wins against all competitors (a tie counting as a win), instead of its sum of votes against all competitors, as does Borda. This means that if there is a Condorcet-winner, then that wine must necessarily be the winner. This method is known in the modern literature as Copeland's method [5] . It yields: or
In first place a French wine, in the first four places three French wines. Eight methods give seven (that magical number!) different rank-orderings of the wines.
Why the Traditional Amalgamation Schemes Fail Meaningfulness
There is no cardinal measure with which to rate wines (as Quandt quite correctly observes). He goes on to state, "Two scales for rating are in common use: (1) the well-known ordinal rank-scale by which wines are assigned ranks …, and (2) a 'grade'-scale, such as the wellpublicized ratings by Robert Parker based on 100 points. The grade scale has some of the aspects of a cardinal scale, in that intervals are interpreted to have meaning, but is not an [interval measure]" [14, p. 2] . These statements raise the important question of "meaningfulness" and require clarification and elaboration.
How to construct a scale for measuring something is a science in itself (see e.g., [10] ). The types of scales have been classified in various ways (of which one follows [15] ). When numbers, names or labels indicate categories (blood type, bus number, telephone code), the scale is a nominal measure. When they indicate order (pain, mineral hardness, destructive power of earthquakes), it is an ordinal measure. Pain, for example, is usually measured on a scale from 0 to 10. The Mankowski scale defines a 2 by "Minor annoyance -occasional strong twinges. No medication needed;" a 3 by "Annoying enough to be distracting. Mild painkillers take care of it;" a 9 by "Unable to speak. Crying out or moaning uncontrollablynear delirium;" and a 10 by "Unconscious. Pain makes you pass out." [16] When in addition to order, equal intervals have the same significance (days of calendars, degrees Celsius and Fahrenheit), it is an interval measure. Finally, when in addition to qualifying as an interval measure, zero has an absolute meaning (dollars, grams, degrees Kelvin), it is a ratio measure. Two key problems present themselves. How to assign scale values to empirical observations is the "representation problem." What analyses of observations are valid as a function of the type of scale is the "meaningfulness problem." It is obviously meaningless to add numbers that are nominal measures: the sum or average of two telephone codes bears no earthly meaning. It is also meaningless to add numbers that are ordinal measures: an increase in pain from 2 to 3 cannot be compared with an increase from 9 to 10 let alone have the same significance. For sums or averages to be meaningful the numbers must come from interval measures such as calendars -an additional day has the same significance whenever it is added in the Gregorian, Hebrew or Moslem calendars -or such as weight, distance or money -one more carries the same meaning to whatever it is added (the last three examples are ratio measures so multiplication makes sense too).
The official results of the Judgment of Paris depend on adding or averaging numbers ranging from 0 to 20. For them to make any sense at all those numbers must be chosen from an interval measure. But that is obviously false.
First, no common definitions were given to the numbers on the scale, so each judge gave his own interpretation of their meanings. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to assume that each judge had his own benchmark wines acquired in years of experience and some absolute sense of what it means to give a 7 or a 17 to a wine; moreover, it is not unreasonable to assume that these benchmarks were fairly similar.
Second, as is so often true when a numerical scale is used, the higher the grade the more difficult it is to raise it: there seems to be a human reluctance to give very high grades. That is certainly the case here although these were a very fine set of wines: of 110 grades none were above 17 and only four reached that level. The scale was not an interval measure, because increasing the grade of a wine from (say) 17 to 18 was much more difficult for a judge to do than increasing a grade from an 11 to a 12. But this immediately implies that the sums and averages of such grades are meaningless, so point-summing fails.
When judges compare wines and the comparisons are amalgamated, as is done in all the methods described above except point-summing, the same difficulties arise. Every one of those methods involves using Borda's basic idea that treats a place in the order as though it were an interval measure. But it is certainly not an interval measure since these methods treat the very different judges' inputs of (3, 4, 5) , (18, 19, 20) and (3, 12, 20) as exactly the same, which they are not: the first believes the wines are all bad and differ little, the second that all are excellent and differ little, the last that there is a huge difference among the quality of all three. Indeed, one cannot but question whether statistical analyses based on "places in the order" are meaningful.
Manipulability
There is also a second major reason that point-summing methods fail in competitions. [7] . A "cranky'' wine judge may be one who errs from lack of judgment or finesse; she may also be a judge who "cheats'' willfully either because she has some predefined agenda (e.g., a high place for friends' wines and a low one for enemies' wines that she believes she can identify) or simply because she wishes to impose her superior will on the collective jury decision. The director of a wine competition complained that in Australia -where typically juries consist of three judges who assign points from a 0 to 20 scale that are averaged to determine decisions -two judges may both give gold medal scores of 18.5 but a cranky third judge can completely thwart the majority opinion by giving a low score.
A glance at the grades given cannot but make one wonder whether the 2's, 3's and 5's were cranky grades. But put that question aside and assume the grades were "honest" evaluations. How might a judge have manipulated and what success might he have had?
Since no judge gave either a 0 (the minimum) or a 20 (the maximum) to any wine, every judge can manipulate the final score of every wine either up or down. Take, for example, C. Dubois-Millot. He could achieve the final order he prefers among A, B*, C*, D*, and E as well as the order he prefers among F*, G, H, I, and J by changing the grades he assigns as follows: Manipulation enables him to obtain exactly the order he wishes except that E is not last.
C. Vanneque's preferred order-of-finish is very different than that given by point-summing:
Manipulation enables him to obtain the order he wishes except for H and a near miss in the order of C* and E. There is ample experimental evidence showing Borda's method is highly manipulable, as are point-summing methods (truncated or not) [1] . They are also, as was seen, meaningless. Point-summing methods have one redeeming property that the others do not: they are "coherent" in that the final order between any two wines does not depend on whether other wines are competing (they avoid "Arrow's paradox").
Point-summing
Coherence
A method of amalgamation is coherent if it ranks one wine X above another Y whatever other wines participate or do not participate in the competition. Theorem: Every method based on comparisons is incoherent.
Take either Borda's or Quandt's method. When used to rank-order all the wines they yield However, when used to rank-order A, B*, C*, and D* alone they yield when used to rank-order A, B* and C* alone they give ; and when A and C* alone they conclude These are all occurrences of Arrow's paradox: depending upon the presence or absence of other wines the order between two (or more) may change. It is quite clearly an unacceptable property. No method that depends on comparisons alone avoids it.
Majority judgment
The U.I.OE. (Union internationale des OEnologues) is an international federation of national oenological associations. Until 2009 they advocated the use of a standard tasting sheet for each wine of a competition (see table 5 ). Each attribute of a wine is evaluated in a language of seven grades: Excellent, Very Good, Good, Passable, Inadequate, Mediocre, Bad. This is an important improvement over assigning undefined points or relying on orders since these evaluations have meaning that are by and large shared by judges (who can refer to the shared benchmarks of years of experience). To each evaluation of every attribute is associated a number of points. Their total points determine the wines' awards and their rank-order. To be awarded a "Grand Gold" a wine must have a total score of 90 or above; a "Gold" a score of at least 85 but below 90; a "Silver" at least 80 but below 85; and a "Bronze" at least 75 but below 80. This is a point-summing method where meaning is given to the points accorded, which is essential. Nevertheless, these points do not constitute an interval measure, so their sums remain meaningless. A judge circles her evaluations in each row.
All of the methods based on comparisons depart from the primitive idea that when the majority of a jury prefers wine A to wine B then that should be the jury's decision. One difficulty with this is that Condorcet's paradox may occur so there is no rank-order and no winner. But there is a deeper, much less appreciated difficulty: there is no real justification for accepting a majority preference even between two wines alone. For suppose -using the U.I.OE. grades -11 judges gave two wines, A and B, the following grades: [1] ). Thus the only way to make coherent decisions and be certain to avoid cyclic jury decisions is precisely to ignore each judge's implicit comparisons and pay attention only to the grades she gives.
Point-summing methods heed this injunction: it is coherent and there is no ambiguity in the rank-orders it determines. It fails because it gives meaningless results and is highly manipulable. What then is to be done?
Majority-grade and majority-ranking
First, a common-language of grades must be defined. The U.I.OE.'s -Excellent, Very Good, Good, Passable, Inadequate, Mediocre, Bad -is an excellent choice. More or fewer grades may be chosen. They must be well defined and understood by all the judges.
Let us assume that the number grades of the Judgment of Paris constituted an acceptable common language of grades. Which judge gave the grades cannot be taken into account, so each wine's grades may be arranged from highest to lowest (as in table 6). A wine's majoritygrade is the grade supported by a majority against any other grade. Wine C*'s majority grade is 14.0 because it obtains a majority of at least 7 to 4 against any lower grade and it obtains a majority of at least 8 to 3 against any higher grade. Using statistical jargon a wine's majoritygrade is the median or middlemost of its grades. Had the grades been words or letters this definition is valid (so number grades are not necessary). The grades -in this case numbersare never added or averaged (since sums are meaningless), their only significance is ordinal, a higher number means a higher grade or better evaluation. Table 6 . Judgment of Paris: grades given wines, their majority-grades italicized.
The majority-grades are used to obtain the majority-ranking of the wines, but -as here -there may be ties that need to be resolved. The rationale for resolving them is simple. Consider wines A and B*. A majority decided each should have the grade 14, so a majority should again decide which should be classed ahead among the remaining grades (when that one 14 is dropped from each). Wine A's second majority-grade is 14 (with at least 8 against a lower grade and at least 6 against a higher grade). Now, however, there is a difficulty because with an even number of grades a tie may occur, as happens here for B*: 5 are for 15 or higher, 5 against. The majority-ranking can contain a tie only if two wines have exactly the same set of grades.
Majority judgment ranks the ten wines differently than any of the other methods previously considered. With what we believe is the only valid method of amalgamating judges' evaluations, the thinkable happened, Gaul defeated California: Chateau Mouton Rothschild 1970 is first, all of the four French wines are among the first six; none of the French wines are among the last four.
Why Majority Judgment
Majority judgment is meaningful. There are two scales for rating in common use, an ordinal scale where wines are assigned ranks and an interval scale where wines are assigned cardinal numbers. But there is also a middle ground that asks for more than ranks but less than an interval scale: an ordinal scale of merit. The U.I.OE.'s word grades and the Mankowski pain scale are examples. Piano, figure skating, gymnastics, diving and many other competitions use number scales whose meanings are carefully defined and/or come to have very definite meanings much as the measurements of length and weight. So long as they are treated as ordinal and not assumed to constitute interval scales the approach is perfectly valid. The very notion of determining a consensual jury decision implies some commonality in a language of absolute grades, determined by widely shared benchmarks. As Wittgenstein so aptly said, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language." Otherwise, meaningful decisions cannot be made.
Majority judgment is the least manipulable.
Both theory and experiments show that among the widely known and recommended methods of amalgamation majority judgment is the least subject to strategic manipulation.
It is strategy-proof-in-grading meaning that if a judge's objective is that a particular wine should be evaluated (say) Very Good then honesty is her optimal strategy: to assign Very Good. Consider, for example, wine The answer is no because that would change nothing in the majority opinion. Symmetrically, P. Tari gave 13 to A, so he too was disappointed but could do nothing to lowering A's majority-grade even by changing the 13 to 0 because, again, majority opinion remains the same. This is an important property for it allows the judge whose primary wish is for the jury decision to assign the grade he believes is merited to forget about strategizing and concentrate on making the correct evaluation.
A judge, however, may have a different agenda in mind: to assign his grades so as to realize the majority-ranking -the final order-of-finish -that he believes in rather than to determine the "correct" majority-grades -the final grades of the wines. One would wish for a method that is strategy-proof-in-ranking, meaning that each judge's optimal strategy when she has the final rankings in mind is again to give her honest evaluations of each wine. Regrettably, Theorem: No method of amalgamation is strategy-proof-in-ranking [1] .
Since perfection cannot be achieved one must accept the best possible. Suppose the finalorder placed A above B and some judge preferred B to A, so wished to reverse that ranking. That judge would be tempted to increase A's grade and decrease B's. With majority judgment if the judge is able to increase A's grade she cannot decrease B's, and if she can decrease B's she cannot increase A's -the method is partially strategy-proof-in-ranking. In fact, Theorem: Majority judgment is the only method that is partially strategy-proof-in-ranking [1] .
To see what all of this means in practice consider, first, the judge Dubois-Millot (who could so easily have manipulated the order-of-finish were either point-summing or Quandt's method used). Contrast the majority-ranking with Dubois-Millot's preferences,
Majority-ranking:
Dubois-Millot's preferences:
Dubois-Millot cannot raise C* in the majority-ranking. Lowering B*'s grade is not sufficient to place B* below C* but puts B* below A, not his intention. He cannot lower E in the majority-ranking, nor can he raise F*. He can raise I (by changing the 9.5 to 12) above H, but cannot raise J nor lower G. All he is able to do is move I up above H.
C. Vanneque's wishes diverge more from the majority-ranking:
Majority-ranking:
Vanneque's preferences: Majority judgment is coherent. Of crucial importance, majority judgment is necessarily coherent because wines are assigned individual grades by judges instead of being compared (the root of all the evils!).
To finish the case for "why" it should be said that all of the assertions made in the above rest on formal proof. Indeed, majority judgment is characterized mathematically as the only method for amalgamating judges' opinions that is coherent and meaningful, does the best in combating manipulation, and heeds the majority opinion (in particular, cranky judges cannot counter the majority will).
Majority judgment in use
"To give a global grade to a wine, one should not immediately think in terms of a numerical value, but rather classify its quality; the grade, in the chosen scale, will follow automatically." So said the great oenologist Émile Peynaud in his classic treatise [11, p. 104] . Indeed, insiders say that professional judges often work backward: they first decide on a wine's quality and then they assign numerical grades to the various attributes so that their sums give the desired outcome. Grading a wine strictly on the basis of the quality of its individual characteristics may miss the point for it "has difficulty in detecting exceptional wines by overly favoring wines that are 'taste-wise correct'" [12, p. 109] . A wine that is truly outstanding in some one attribute yet has clear flaws in others may well classify as sublime, well above all the other competing wines, yet lag the others when the evaluations are based on attributes.
The previous discussion has shown that the use of numbers without specific meanings gives meaningless results; moreover, the very use of numbers suggests that they will be summed to determine final decisions (though summing is meaningless since they do not constitute interval measures), so they induce strategic behavior, the attribution of points that may not be honest. For these reasons, a set of grades such as the seven given by the U.I.OE., should be used, though six may be sufficient (in most competitions Bad is not used at all).
Experts of great taste and experience will integrate for themselves the importance of the various attributes, so should simply be asked to assign one of the six or seven grades. However, juries composed of judges of limited experience and tasting ability should be asked to assign one of the six or seven grades to each of the attributes. They may not be able to integrate the relative importance of the attributes, they may overlook some of them in their evaluations, and they are undoubtedly more at ease when faced with the more specific task of addressing specific qualities. This means that majority judgment must be extended to ranking wines that are given a grade for each of several attributes.
The U.I.OE. revised its scoring sheets in 2009 (Table 7) . The two lowest grades were dropped probably because they were little used. Regrettably the word descriptions were dropped except for Excellent and Inadequate, thereby emphasizing the comparative aspects rather than the absolute nature of the evaluations. However, an additional row was adjoined below the score sheet, "Eliminated due to a major defect": a wine with two such mentions cannot be awarded a medal. The former scoring sheet (Table 5 ) contained 14 attributes to be evaluated individually, all of approximately the same numerical weight or importance, the new one (Table 7) We advocate restoring words as grades, eliminating numbers altogether, and using an even number of grades -for example, Excellent, Very Good, Good, Passable, Inadequate, Bad -so as to eliminate the possibility of "opting for the middle."
Les Citadelles du Vin
The Citadelles du Vin is an annual wine competition held in the Bordeaux area every June that is organized by the well-known oenologist Jacques Blouin. In 2006 some sixty judges organized into twelve juries of five judges classified 1,247 wines. Two methods were used to amalgamate judges' opinions, the official U.I.OE. point-summing method and majority judgment with a single global criterion and five grades, Excellent, Very Good, Good, Fair, and Mediocre. These words appeared on the scoring sheets (Very Good, Good, and Fair replacing in that order the three 's). 2 The responses of one jury on three white wines, A, B, and C are given in 
Majority judgment for expert juries
We believe (as has already been said) that truly expert juries should give their global evaluations in a single scale preferably of six grades (instead of the five used here).
The majority judgment procedure is simple. List the grades of each from highest to lowest: The majority-grade is the middlemost grade. A's majority-grade is Very Good, B's and C's Good. Thus A is judged the best of the three. To decide on the order between B and C, the remaining grades must decide, so drop the "first" (equal) majority-grades (see below). When there is an even number of grades the majority-grade is the lower middlemost grade. This is the general procedure, though in this case it is immediately evident that C is judged better than B since they only differ in one grade.
This order happens to agree with the usual U.I.OE. point-summing method determined by the respective wines' averages of the total points over all attributes given by the judges, A obtaining an average of 87.2, B of 82.0 and C of 83.6.
Multi-criteria majority judgment for ordinary juries
Evaluating several attributes independently has the advantages and disadvantages already discussed. The several -in this case10 -independent evaluations of a wine by 3 judges may be thought of as 30 independent judges evaluating the merits of different aspects of the wine. If the different aspects bear the same importance then majority judgment may be applied as though there were one global evaluation of each wine by 30 judges. We believe that when possible it is best for the attributes to be defined so that they do bear the same importance (as is suggested by the points accorded in the 2006 version of the U.I.OE.'s scoring sheet).
In the 2009 version, however, the attributes have differing importance or weights. One approximation of the relative weights of importance of the attributes is to simply add the points used for each criterion (given in The multi-criteria majority judgment procedure replicates the grades of each criterion according to its weight and applies majority judgment to this extended set of grades. The data is exactly the same but in table 9 the word grades are inserted rather than their corresponding points.
The procedure is explained for wine A. Every grade assigned to the three wines is either This data allows the majority-grades of each attribute of the wines to be calculated as well, which is useful information (they are given in table 9 ). Note that the weighted majority-grade of a wine's attribute is necessarily the same as the majority-grade (without replication) of that wine's attribute.
The total count of grades for wine A is (531,778,521,0) or 531 Excellent, 778 Very Good, 521 Good and 0 Fair. B's total count is (195,714,736,125) and C's (165,980,625,0) .
It would be laborious, to say the least, to write down in order 1,830 grades. There is a simpler procedure. An absolute majority is 916 or more. Therefore, A's majority-grade is Very Good since there is less than a majority for Excellent and an absolute majority for at least Very Good.
A wine's majority-gauge is a triplet (p, majority-grade , q), where p is the number of grades above the majority-grade and q is the number of grades below the majority-grade. A " " is adjoined if there are more grades above the majority-grade than there are grades below it (if ), and a "-" otherwise. Thus the three wines' majority-gauges are When wine X's majority-grade is above Y's, ; When they have the same majority-grade, X's with a and Y's with a -, ; When they have the same majority-grade and both are or both are -, the biggest of the four associated numbers of grades decide: if it is one of X's and it is the number of grades above the majority-grade, , whereas if it is one of X's and it is the number of grades below the majority-grade, .
This rule gives exactly the majority-ranking obtained by the laborious procedure unless it produces a tie in the ranking (unlikely when there are many grades). If this occurs and there is a need to resolve the tie the laborious procedure may be used (which guarantees there can be no tie unless both wines have exactly the same numbers of each grade).
In conclusion
The foremost reasons why majority judgment should be used to amalgamate the opinions of judges to make jury decisions -to reach a jury consensus on the value of each wine and on how they should be ranked -have been presented. A much more complete and detailed theoretical argument together with proofs is presented in the book [1] , where experimental evidence in diverse uses including the award of prizes and elections is described as well.
